Organized by:
Sofiana Chiriacescu and Klaus von Heusinger

The starting point for the conference's theme is the connection between the discourse structure and the use of referring expressions. It is well recognized in the literature that the discourse affects the interpretation of referring expressions and the space of anaphoric accessibility and that the use of referring expressions restricts the set of possible discourse interpretations.

The workshop will explore four related topics to be analyzed in order to achieve a broad Crosslinguistic understanding of reference in discourse in natural languages.

Topics:
- Discourse and reference
- Specificity
- Point of view
- Discourse particles

Supported by:

Programme

Thursday, 14.1.2010

Extra talk within the "Guest lecture series" of the SFB 732 at the University of Stuttgart (Room 17.17; Keplerstr. 17, first floor, University building close to the main station)

17:30-19:00	Jeanette Gundel	Reference and Accessibility from a Givenness Hierarchy Perspective

Friday, 15.1.2010

9.00-9.15	Opening remarks	
9.15-10.45	Tania Ionin	An experimental study on the scop of (un)modified indefinites
10.45-11.00	Coffee break	
11.00-12.30	Sofiana Chiriacescu & Klaus von Heusinger	Discourse accessibility and pe-marking in Romanian
12.45-13.45	Lunch	
14.00-16.45	Excursion	
16.45-17.00	Tea	
17.00-18.30	Ljudmila Geist	Bare singular indefinites in argument position: The case of Russian
19.00-20.00	Dinner	
20.00-20.30	Annika Deichsel	Demonstrative and non-demonstrative "dieser" in German
20.30-21.00	Eva Böhme	The complex determiner "der und der" in German

Saturday, 16.1.2010

9.00-9.45	Klaus von Heusinger	Discourse properties of specific indefinites
9.45-10.30	Paula Menendez-Benito	Modal Indefinites and Domain Constraints
10.30-11.00	Coffee break	
11.00-11.30	Jin Cui	Indefinites and specificity in Mandarin
11.30-12.00	Alexei Chibakov	Indefinite articles in modern Uzbek and their usages in specific contexts
11.00-12.30	Johny Varsami	Indefinite articles in Moroccan Arabic
12.45-14,00	Lunch	
14.00-15.30	Elsi Kaiser	Investigating the consequences of focus on the production and comprehension of referring expressions
15.30-15.45	Tea	
15.45-16.30	Cornelia Ebert & Christian Ebert & Stefan Hinterwimmer	The Interpretation of the German Specificity Markers Bestimmt and Gewiss
16.30-17.15	Geertje van Bergen	Scrambling in spoken Dutch
17.15-19.00	Discussion in smaller groups	
19.00	Dinner	
20.00	Party	

Sunday, 17.1.2010

9.00-10.15	Elena Karagjosova	Discourse particles: Incremental specification in context
10.30-11.45	Edgar Onea	Specificational particles
12.00-13.00	Lunch	
13.00-14.30	Henk Zeevat	Producing and Interpreting Pronouns and Ellipsis
14.30-15.00	Closing remarks	

Abstracts

Scrambling in spoken Dutch
Geertje van Bergen

In this talk I will present the results of a corpus study of scrambling in spoken Dutch. Scrambling is a type of word order variation in Dutch that involves the placement of a direct object relative to an adverb, exemplified in (1)-(2):

(1)   Unscrambled (adverb > object)
      Sonja   heeft **gisteren   de kaas**   *opgegeten.*
      Sonja   has   yesterday   the cheese eaten
      'Sonja ate the cheese yesterday.'

(2)   Scrambled (object > adverb)
      Sonja   heeft **de kaas   gisteren**   *opgegeten.*
      Sonja has   the cheese yesterday   eaten
      'Sonja ate the cheese yesterday.'

We investigated the scrambling behaviour of direct objects in over 8500 sentences that were extracted from the Spoken Dutch Corpus. We found that scrambling strongly depends on the definiteness properties of the direct object, and that the effect of definiteness is different from what is generally assumed in the literature. The definiteness effect on object scrambling will be explained in terms of accessibility.

Discourse accessibility and *pe*-marking in Romanian
Sofiana Chiriacescu & Klaus von Heusinger

Referential expressions introduce discourse referents with particular referential properties, but also with an activation level that reflects their accessibility for subsequent anaphoric expressions. Romanian expresses Differential Object Marking (DOM) by the particle *pe*, which is obligatory for personal pronouns, proper names and in general for definite noun phrases. However, the particle is optional for indefinite noun phrases, allowing the realization of referential properties such as epistemic readings and wide scope readings. We further claim that *pe*-marking in Romanian signals "referential persistence", a discourse property closely connected with a high activation level of the associated referent. In the talk, we elaborate upon this claim and extend our analysis to some particular cases of optional DOM for definite "bare" noun phrases. We will discuss different tests in order to show that *pe* with definite "bare" noun phrases signals referential persistence as well.

Indefinite Articles in the Modern Uzbek and their usage in specific contexts
Alexei Chibakov

The modern Uzbek has two indefinite articles - bir and bitta. While bir is older, bitta has gradually developed in recent times. The semantic and pragmatic difference between them has not yet been analyzed, however there is reason to believe that there is a conventional difference between these articles since in some cases only the one or the other can be used depending on the semantic features of the nouns or the contextual information. In this talk a first attempt for an empirical analysis is presented.

In a first questionnaire study it was found that NPs denoting humans can have both articles, while other NPs may have either only bitta or only bir. In a second questionaire study standard semantic/pragmatic tests regarding specificity (interaction with quantifiers, speaker identifiability etc.) have been applied showing that there is a tendency to interpret bitta as specific in intensional contexts.

Indefinites and specificity in Mandarin
Jin Cui

Mandarin is a language without (in)definite article. Generally there are tow ways in Mandarin to mark a noun phrase as indefinite: Cl-NP and "one"-CL-NP. It was supposed in the literature (Cheng&Sybesma 1999, 2005) that the previous one is limited to a non-specific indefinite reading, while the latter one may be interpreted specific and non-specific.

In this short talk I will present a current part of an empirical work. With a questionnaire stady and a subsequent corpus-analysis I will try to check whether the distinction between Cl-NP and "one"-CL-NP depends essentially on specificity, and what kind of specificity takes the deciding function in this aspect.

Demonstrative and Non-Demonstrative „dieser" in German
Annika Deichsel

As far as demonstratives are concerned, the standard procedure in reference grammars is to give a few examples for straightforward situational use (pointing to visible entities located at various degrees of distance away from the speaker), and to add a remark stating that the demonstrative may also be used anaphorically to refer back to a referent previously introduced in the discourse: Demonstrative pronouns such as German "dieser" are generally described as definite and rigid determiners. Ionin (2006) assumes that the so-called non-demonstrative use of English "this" is indefinite and therefore different from the common demonstrative use. In this talk I firstly want to present a taxonomy of further uses of „dieser" in German (recognitional use, discourse-deictic use, non-demonstrative use), willing to establish clear-cut criteria in order to differentiate non-demonstrative uses of „dieser" from demonstrative ones – aiming on facilitating further research on the characteristics of non-demonstrative „dieser" (how it differs from definite and indefinite NPs) and with the future

goal to hypothizise on the question if we should treat the phenomenon of non-demonstrative „dieser" as an extension of the standard deictic use or if we should assume two different lexical entries, as Ionin (2006) does.

I will compare the different forms of uses and point out similarities and potential links or intermediate stages between them, arguing that a potential interface between demonstrative and non-demonstrative uses of „dieser" might lie in the recognitional use, which can only be distinguished from the non-demonstrative form by factors like hearer-accessibility/hearer-given vs. hearer-new information.

References:
Ionin, T. (2006). This is Definitely Specific: Specificity and Definiteness in Article Systems. *Natural Language Semantics* 14(2), 175-234.

The Interpretation of the German Specificity Markers *Bestimmt* and *Gewiss*
Cornelia Ebert & Christian Ebert & Stefan Hinterwimmer

German has two markers that indicate specificity in the sense of a strong tendency to scope over intensional operators contained within the same sentence: *bestimmt* and *gewiss*. Both items can be used in DPs headed by either the indefinite article *ein* or by a numeral, and with bare plurals, but not in DPs headed by other quantificational determiners. This paper concentrates on sentences with singular indefinites. We will argue that while the contribution of both items consists in the added information that some individual is able to identify the discourse referent introduced by the indefinite article via some non-trivial additional description (cf. [3] on *certain*), they differ with respect to the level at which this information is interpreted: in the case of *bestimmt* it is part of the at-issue content of the sentence, while in the case of *gewiss* it is interpreted at the separate level where conventional implicatures are processed ([5]). This conclusion is based on the following empirical observations:

I. The presence of *gewiss* in an indefinite requires the speaker to be able to give some further, non-trivial specification concerning the discourse referent introduced by the indefinite article. This is shown by the oddity of the continuation in (1a) as well as by the fact that *gewiss* is incompatible with the item *irgend-* („whatever"), which signals speaker ignorance. In the case of *bestimmt*-indefinites, in contrast, the ability to give the required specification may be attributed to some other salient individual:

(1) a. Peter sucht schon seit Stunden nach (*irgend)einer gewissen CD Peter searches already since hours after a-FEM.DAT gewiss-FEM.DAT CD
– # keine Ahnung, welche genau er sucht no idea which-one exactly he searches.
b. Peter sucht schon seit Stunden nach (irgend)einer bestimmten CD Peter searches already since hours after a-FEM.DAT bestimmt-FEM.DAT CD
– keine Ahnung, welche genau er sucht no idea which-one exactly he searches.
„ Peter has been looking for a particular/certain CD for hours now – I have no idea which one exactly he is looking for."

II. While in sentences with intensional operators, both *bestimmt*-indefinites (henceforth: BIs) and *gewiss*-indefinites (henceforth: GIs) must take scope over at least one such operator, GIs must necessarily take *widest scope* w.r.t. to *all* intensional operators:

(2) Peter glaubt, dass Paula einen bestimmten/gewissen Mann heiraten muss. Peter believes that Paula a-MASC.ACC bestimmt/gewiss-MASC.ACC man marry must „Peter believes that Paula has to marry a particular/certain man".

In the version with the BI, a *de dicto* reading is available according to which the indefinite receives narrow scope with respect to the propositional attitude verb *glauben* (believe), i.e. it does not have to be the case that there is a particular man of whom Peter believes that Paula has to marry him. The only thing that is required for the sentence to be true is that Peter believes such a man to exist, i.e. the indefinite has to take scope over *muss* (must). In the case with the GI, in contrast, there has to be a man (about whom the speaker knows something else) such that Peter believes of this man that Paula has to marry him, i.e. the only available reading is the *de re* reading w.r.t. *glauben* (believe) where the indefinite takes widest scope.

III. While GIs always have to take widest scope, BIs may also scope under operators like negation and other quantificational DPs, and they can be interpreted inside conditionals.

(3) Ich habe keine bestimmte/*gewisse Person für die Stelle im Kopf. I have not-a FEM-ACC person for the position in-the head „I don"t have a particular person in mind for the position."

(4) Wenn morgen alle Kinder ein bestimmtes/gewisses Pferd reiten wollen, If tomorrow all children a bestimmt/gewiss-NEUT.ACC horse ride want

haben wir ein Problem have we a problem.

„If tomorrow all children want to ride a particular/certain horse, we will have a problem."

Keine(e) has been argued to be the phonetic spellout of the combination of *nicht* („not") and the indefinite article ([4]), where the former has scope over the latter. Its incompatibility with *gewiss* in (3a) thus shows that *gewiss* cannot scope under negation. Concerning (4), the version with the GI can only be interpreted as saying that there is a horse (which can be further specified by the speaker) such that there will be a problem if all children want to ride that horse. The version with the BI, in contrast, also has two additional readings: one according to which there is trouble if all children want to ride the same horse (no matter, which one it is) and one according to which there is already trouble if all children are picky with respect to the horses they want to ride, i.e. if for each child there is one and only one horse that s/he wants to ride.

IV. In contrast to BIs, GIs must be interpreted with scope over speech acts like questions:

(5) Geht Paul immer in eine bestimmte/gewisse Kneipe? Goes Paul always in a bestimmt/gewiss-FEM.ACC pub

„Does Paul always go to a particular/certain pub?"

According to the most salient reading of the version with the BI, the speaker asks whether there is a pub such that Paul regularly goes there, i.e. the speaker does not have a particular pub in mind and the existence of any pub whatsoever that is regularly visited by Paul would be enough to answer the question affirmatively. In the GI case, in contrast, the speaker not only indicates that s/he has a particular pub in mind, but furthermore, in order for the question to be felicitous, the hearer has to know which pub the speaker means. The question thus can be paraphrased as "Does Paul go regularly to this special pub that we both know?"

We propose a formal analysis which argues that the properties in (I. –IV.) can all be accounted for by assuming that both *bestimmt* and *gewiss* contribute the information that some individual a knows the identity of the individual denoted by the discourse referent of the indefinite under some salient conceptual cover (where conceptual covers are sets of individual concepts which exhaustively and exclusively cover the domain of individuals, see [1]), and where a is a free variable that can either be resolved to a salient individual or be turned into a variable bound by a c-commanding quantifier. In other words, both items add the information that some individual a knows the answer to the concealed identity question *What/who is x?* with respect to some salient conceptual cover, where x is the variable bound by the existential quantifier of the indefinite. The crucial difference between the two is that in the case of BIs, this information is part of the at-issue content and is therefore interpreted wherever the indefinite takes scope (including the option of island-violating scope, which is empirically well-attested for indefinites in general). In the case of GIs, in contrast, the information is a conventional implicature in the sense of [5], which means that it is processed at an independent level of meaning. This, however, is only compatible with (a) a being resolved to the speaker and (b) the indefinite taking widest scope (including functional widest scope in the sense of [2]).

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Bare Singular Indefinites in Argument Positions: The Case of Russian
Ljudmila Geist

It has been assumed that Russian is an articleless language, in which bare singular NPs can occur in argument positions. However, although NPs are not explicitly marked for (in)definiteness in Russian, their interpretation with respect to (in)definiteness must be determined in the context. In this paper, I focus on the conditions that trigger the indefinite interpretation of bare argument NPs. While the definite interpretation depends on the broader discourse and is not subject to further restrictions, the indefinite interpretation seems to be restricted with respect to the information structure of the sentence. Bare NPs referring to individuals may be interpreted as indefinite only when they appear in focus position but not in background position. To account for this restriction, I assume (i) that bare NPs in Russian are variables, which may get bound by whatever operator is in the sentence to bind them (analogous to Heim's 1982 analysis of English indefinites) and (ii) that the focus part provides the default existential binding of variables. For the latter assumption I modify the Mapping Hypothesis by Diesing (1992), which is based on the syntactic partition of a sentence in NPs and VPs, and argue instead that the semantic partition of a sentence into a restrictive clause and a nuclear scope is determined by the information structure in Russian.

Reference and Accessibility from a Givenness Hierarchy Perspective
Jeanette Gundel

The notion of accessibility, in one sense or another, has played a central role in most accounts of discourse reference. While accessibility is rarely mentioned in research within the Givenness Hierarchy (GH) framework (Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski 1993 and other work), the GH has often been interpreted by others as an accessibility hierarchy, within the broader family of referential hierarchies that includes work of Prince (1981), Givon (1983), Ariel (1988) inter alia. In this paper, I will show how the GH is fundamentally different from these other referential hierarchies, both with respect to accessibility and in the kinds of assumptions and predictions it makes. While forms that are hypothesized to encode cognitive statuses on the GH as part of their conventional meaning may be characterized as constraining, and thus providing information about, manner of accessibility (specifically how/where the referent can be accessed in the hearer's mind), the GH itself is not a hierarchy of degrees of (ease of) accessibility in the sense of other referential hierarchies. I will discuss the implications of this distinction and the role of the GH as one of a number of interacting systems/factors that contribute to the production and interpretation of referring forms in natural language discourse, some of these grammar-driven and some determined by more general pragmatic/cognitive principles.

Discourse properties of specific indefinites
Klaus von Heusinger

Specific indefinites have semantic properties: they are referential expressions, i.e. they allow for de re readings, they strongly prefer wide scope reading or they are epistemic expressions. Specific indefinites also show some discourse properties: they introduce discourse referents that are noteworthy, and they show "referential persistence", i.e. they trigger anaphoric expression in the subsequent discourse. The semantic properties are categorical, while the discourse properties are rather gradable. The talk investigates (i) the relation between the semantic properties and the discourse properties, and (ii) the mapping between gradable and categorical properties. One further question I address is whether the semantic properties are grammaticalized discourse properties or whether the discourse properties are epiphenomena of the semantic behavior of specific indefinites.

An experimental study on the scope of (un)modified indefinites
Tania Ionin

There has been much theoretical literature on the ability of English indefinites to have *long-distance* (LD) scope readings. Unlike other quantifier phrases, indefinites can scope out of an island such as a relative clause in (1a) and take either *widest scope* (context (2a)), or *intermediate scope* beneath a higher quantifier (context (2b)) (Farkas 1981 and much subsequent literature); indefinites can also have local, narrow-scope readings (2c). An

influential approach to LD readings derives them through the non-quantificational mechanism of Choice Functions (CFs), which map any non-empty set in their domain to a member of this set, as in (3) (Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997, Kratzer 1998, i.a.).

While CF theories assume LD scope to be freely available to English *a* indefinites, prior experimental work (Ionin 2008, under review) has shown that linguistically naïve native English speakers in fact strongly disprefer both widest-scope and intermediate-scope readings of *a* indefinites, in comparison to their narrow-scope readings. In contrast, *a certain* indefinites (which are usually analyzed as obligatorily non-quantificational – Kratzer 1998, Schwarz 2001, i.a.) have been found to freely allow LD scope. These results support the proposal of Schwarz (2001) that *a* indefinites and *a certain* indefinites are derived through different mechanisms.

The present study seeks to expand on these findings, by comparing the four different kinds of indefinites in (1a-d). It has often been claimed (Beghelli 1995, Winter 2001, i.a.) that modified numeral indefinites such as *exactly/at least one* (1c-d) are obligatorily quantificational, unlike *a/one*-indefinites (1a-b). If LD readings are derived by a non-quantificational mechanism, they should be available to *a/one* but not to *exactly/at least one* indefinites.

This prediction was tested using a written Truth-Value Judgment Task (TVJT), in which participants (adult native English speakers) evaluated the truth of sentences such as those in (1a-d) in the context of stories such as (2a-c) (each item consisted of a single story-sentence pair). The contexts in (2a-b) always make the target sentence false on the narrow-scope reading of the indefinite, so the response of TRUE indicates the availability of the widest-scope (2a) or intermediate-scope (2b) reading. The results indicate that LD readings are equally available to *one* and *exactly one* indefinites, and less available to *a* and *at least one* indefinites.

These results cannot be accounted for on CF theories, which predict LD readings to be unavailable to *exactly one* indefinites as much as to *at least one* indefinites. Two alternative explanations of the findings are discussed. The first is the 'singleton indefinite' approach of Schwarzschild (2002), on which indefinites are obligatorily quantificational and subject to island constraints, and LD scope is an illusion created by implicit domain restriction to a singleton set. The second is the view that indefinites are able to scope out of islands after all (cf. the 'scope-shifting' approach in Schwarz 2001), but that LD scope, like inverse local scope, is dispreferred for processing reasons (cf. Anderson 2004). It is shown that neither explanation can fully capture the experimental findings without additional modifications. The role of pragmatics is discussed, and it is suggested that LD scope is facilitated when the narrow-scope reading is pragmatically infelicitous in the context. Taken together, the findings highlight the value of experimentally testing the predictions of semantic theories. This paper will also pose questions for further research that arise in light of the findings.

(1) a. Every student read every book that a teacher had recommended.
     b. Every student read every book that one teacher had recommended.
     c. Every student read every book that exactly one teacher had recommended.
     d. Every student read every book that at least one teacher had recommended.

(2) a. *context matches widest-scope reading of indefinite:*
    a teacher>every student>every book

The two English teachers – Ms. Baker and Mr. Smith – made summer reading lists for their students. Each teacher put six recommended books on his or her list, with no overlap between the lists. All of the students in the class really liked Ms. Baker's list, so they finished all the books on it. But they found Mr. Smith's list boring, and didn't read more than one or two books from it.

    b. *context matches intermediate-scope reading of indefinite:*
    every student>a teacher>every book

The two social studies teachers – Ms. Rosen and Mr. Gomez – made summer reading lists for their students. Each teacher put five books on his or her list, with no overlap between the lists. The students didn't read all of the recommended books, though. Half of the students read all the books from Ms. Rosen's list, but ignored Mr. Gomez's list entirely. Whereas the other half of the students read all the books from Mr. Gomez's list, but no more than one or two books from Ms. Rosen's list.

    c. *context matches narrow-scope reading of indefinite:*
    every student>every book>a teacher

Ms. Willard and Mr. Thompson, the two foreign language teachers in the school, made summer reading lists for their students. Each teacher put four books on his or her list, with no overlap between the lists. The students were very well-behaved: all students finished all eight books. They wanted to please their teachers.

(3) CF analysis, with Existential Closure of CF at different levels (Reinhart 1997, Winter 1997):

a. widest scope: $\exists f$ [[every student] λ_1 [t_1 read every book that f(teacher) had recommended]]

b. inter. scope: [[every student] λ_1 $\exists f$ [t_1 read every book that f(teacher) had recommended]]

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Investigating the consequences of focus on the production and comprehension of referring expressions
Elsi Kaiser

This talk investigates issues related to referent tracking in discourse, in particular how the presence of contrastive focus or additive focus influences comprehenders' and speakers' expectations about what will be referred to/mentioned in upcoming discourse. I will discuss the results of a series of psycholinguistic experiments that investigated (i) how the notion of 'focus' contributes to how prominently entities are represented in speakers' and comprehenders' mental representations, and (ii) what role focus-induced alternatives play in subsequent discourse. On the one hand, it has been suggested that focus increases the prominence/salience of the focused constituent. On the other hand, existing work also suggests that the presence of competitors/alternatives can lower the salience of the intended referent. The experiments I will talk about address focus-related effects on referring expressions from two angles: (i) The perspective of the *comprehender*: When faced with a pronoun, how does a comprehender resolve it? (ii) The perspective of the *speaker*: When continuing a discourse fragment, what entities are speakers most likely to refer to, and with what kind of referring expressions (see also Kehler et al. 2008)? Looking at the discourse-level consequences of focus from these two angles allows us to better understand the effects of focus as well as the discourse-status of focus-induced alternatives, and highlights (potentially unexpected) asymmetries between likelihood of upcoming mention and likelihood of pronominalization. Broadly speaking, this research aims to contribute to our understanding of the notion of accessibility/salience by looking at an entity's likelihood of pronominalization and likelihood of subsequent mention, and how they are affected by the entity's focus status and its connections to other previously-mentioned entities.

Discourse particles: Incremental specification in context
Elena Karagjosova

In the first part of the talk, I will present an ongoing large-scale project that examines the discourse properties which control the interpretation of discourse particles. This issue is pursued by looking at the distribution and interpretation of discourse particles in the so-called *Nacherstposition* in German. *Nacherstposition* is the position immediately following the first constituent in a matrix clause. It is generally assumed that the presence of discourse particles in this position is, amongst others, accompanied by a topic shift effect. We intend to develop a

semantic and pragmatic model for the interpretation of particles in *Nacherstposition*, thereby analysing the interpretation of discourse particles as a process of incremental specification in context emanating from underspecified representations. In the second part of the talk I will focus on the German discourse particle "nämlich" and present some initial thoughts on the discourse relations that it may mark and the role of information structure in specifying these relations.

Specificational particles
Edgar Onea

This paper concentrates on the discourse pragmatic analysis of the German particle *nämlich*. *Nämlich* is traditionally described as having a specificational reading such that the expression *nämlich* is attached to specify a previously underspecified discourse referent, and a causal reading such that the expression *nämlich* is attached to give some kind of explanation for the previous utterance. In this paper we will argue for a unified analysis of *nämlich* as a discourse marker which simply marks that the expression it is attached to is to be understood as an answer to a salient question about the previous utterance. Moreover, we will provide a comparison between *nämlich* and additional discourse particles from German (*und zwar*) and Hungarian (*éspedig* and *ugyanis*) having similar semantic contributions, which will lead to a more complex overall picture about specificational particles.

Modal Indefinites and Domain Constraints
Paula Menendez-Benito & Luis Alonso-Ovalle

Across languages, we Þnd indeÞnites that trigger modal inferences. This work contributes to a semantic typology of these items by contrasting Spanish "algún" with indeÞnites like German "irgendein" or Italian "uno qualsiasi. While "irgendein"-type indeÞnites trigger a Free Choice effect (Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002; Chierchia 2006), "algún" simply signals that at least two individuals in its domain are possibilities. Additionally, "algún", but not "irgendein", can convey that the speaker does not know how many individuals satisfy the existential claim in the world of evaluation. We contend that the two types of indeÞnites impose different constraints on their domain of quantiÞcation: "irgendein" and its kin are domain wideners (as argued by Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002), whereas "algún" is an 'anti-singleton' indeÞnite (its domain cannot be restricted to a singleton). This, together with the fact that "algún" does not require uniqueness, allows us to derive the contrast between "irgendein" and "algún" by using the pragmatic reasoning put forward in Kratzer and Shimoyama 2002.

Indefinite articles in Moroccan Arabic
Johny Varsami

Unlike Standard Arabic which hasn't got any indefinite articles, Moroccan Arabic can make use of *ṣi* and *wahed l-* to introduce an indefinite noun phrase. This research project shall prove that *ṣi* is used in narrow scope and *wahed l-* in wide scope contexts, so that different specificity is expressed. Furthermore we try to find out, when the bare noun form (no article) is applied.

In a first round one informant was asked to decide which article he would chose for a couple of example sentences representing different scope contexts. The results will be shown in this presentation. The second round will consist of an internet questionnaire to be filled out by as many speakers of Moroccan Arabic as possible.

Producing and Interpreting Pronouns and Ellipsis
Henk Zeevat

Pronoun resolvers are complicated because of blocking: a phenomenon that is essentially a side product of production. The talk will attempt to explain how generalisations about production and interpretation must be combined to give a simple account of pronouns and ellipsis. The production of rhetorical structure is essential to the account.

Venue

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From the Main Railway Station in Stuttgart
1. By tram
The tram station (represented by this blue sign) is one floor down, coming from the railway station. It is called "Arnulf-Klett-Platz"/Main Station. You need to buy your ticket from a machine. A single ticket costs € 2,35 (you can alsouse notes). Take the tram U5 or U6 to the station *Möhringen.* Change into tram U3 direction *Plieningen Garbe* and continue to the last station *Plieningen Garbe*.
2. By Tube (= S-Bahn)
Follow the green S-signs until you find the Tube Station. You can take the tube S1, S2 or S3 up to the station *Vaihingen.* Change there to tram U3 direction *Plieningen Garbe* and continue until the last station *Plieningen Garbe*. When you are at the final station, go in the direction of travelling and you will walk past a post office, a bank and continue to a roundabout. Cross it and go straight ahead (on your left side you will see restaurant called "Gasthaus Garbe"). Please turn to the right at Paracelsusstrasse. After about 300m you will see, on the right side of the road, our Guest House "Christkönigshaus", which is next to the Catholic Academy.

If you are coming by car .....
From the motorway A8 coming from Munich: Take the exit Stuttgart Plieningen. Go straight ahead, over the crossing towards Plieningen. Follow the main road through Plieningen until you reach a roundabout. At the roundabout, take the first exit to the right and you will be on the "Garbenstraße" and then again take the first road to the right – Paracelsusstraße. After about 300m you will see, on the right side of the road, our Guest House "Christkönigshaus", which is next to the Catholic Academy.
From the motorway A8 coming from Karlsruhe: Take the exit Stuttgart Plieningen. At the next crossing turn left and continue towards Plieningen. After the yellow sign "Plieningen", turn left at the next crossing (towards Hohenheim). Follow the main road until you reach a roundabout. At the roundabout, take the first exit to the right and you will be on the "Garbenstraße" and then again take the first road to the right – Paracelsusstraße. After about 300m you will see, on the right side of the road, our Guest House "Christkönigshaus", which is next to the Catholic Academy.

If you are coming by plane .....
Once you are at the airport, go to the floor where the tube station is (follow the green S-sign). You need to buy a ticket from the ticket-machine. The ticket you need costs € 2,35 (the machine takes coins but also notes). Take the tube S1 or S2 to the station *Vaihingen*; get off

there and change to the tram U3 to *Plieningen Garbe*. Get off at the last station called *Plieningen Garbe*. From the Airport to the "Christkönigshaus" it takes about 30 minutes. If you decide to take a taxi from the airport it will cost you about € 10,00 and it takes about 10 minutes.

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70629 Stuttgart

B:
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Sekr. 0711-685-8 3139
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